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THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF 
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
TWENTY YEARS LATER 
The Honourable R. Roy McMurtry

 
When I became the Attorney General for Ontario in 1975, Robert Bourassa 
was premier of Quebec but René Lévesque’s Parti Québécois had become a 
major political force. The Government of Ontario agreed with Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau that a renewal of constitutional discussions would strengthen the 
federalist forces in Quebec. 
An entrenched charter of rights had a particular appeal as it was expected to 
receive strong public support and could also act as a counter to Quebec’s 
increasing demands for additional legislative authority. 
Constitutional discussions with the provinces were therefore initiated and 
continued after the election of the Parti Québécois in 1976. However, no real 
progress had been made by the time of the 1980 Quebec referendum. 
During the 1980 Quebec referendum Prime Minister Trudeau had promised 
the people of Quebec constitutional reform and “renewed federalism,” as he 
expressed it, without being very specific. When the separatist side was defeated 
in the 1980 referendum the Constitution did become a priority for the Prime 
Minister and the day after the referendum Jean Chrétien met with Premier 
William Davis and myself in Toronto. What followed was a long hot summer of 
constitutional discussions involving federal and provincial attorneys general, 
ministers of intergovernmental affairs and their officials. A proposed charter of 
rights was but one of 12 topics, which included communications, equalization, 
family law, the Supreme Court, fisheries, a statement of principles, offshore 
resources, resource ownership powers over the economy, the Senate and 
patriation — quite a plateful to say the least. 
I believe that the Trudeau approach to a charter of rights was significantly 
influenced by the Duplessis years. Premier Maurice Duplessis had presided 
over an authoritarian, corrupt and nationalist regime that had held Quebec 
back from general postwar development. His government sacrificed the rule 
of law to political ends, denied freedom of speech to critics and non-
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conformists, denied freedom of association to those battling for economic 
rights against big business and denied religious freedom to Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. 
I also recall Mr. Trudeau telling me about his own brief stint in the federal civil 
service some years before his entry into politics. He had been incredulous at the 
fact that he, a French Canadian, could not write a memorandum in French to his 
superior and he marvelled at the absence of a French sign designating the Prime 
Minister’s office. 
In particular, the Government of Ontario was very supportive of what we 
believed to be the core of the Trudeau approach to constitutional reform, namely, 
his belief in the provision of constitutional protection for language and education 
rights. We agreed that this would undercut growing French-Canadian nationalism 
in Quebec by releasing French-Canadians from what Mr. Trudeau perceived as 
their national ghetto. 
We therefore supported Pierre Trudeau’s opposition to the features of the 
Canadian federal system which considered Quebec as the only real home of 
French-Canadians and encouraged an erosion of the French-Canadian presence 
in other parts of the country. I was personally committed to the strengthening of 
the French language in Ontario and within a few weeks of becoming Attorney 
General in 1975 committed the government to the creation of a bilingual court 
system. 
The government of Ontario supported the entrenchment of language rights in 
the Charter so that all Canadians could engage at both the provincial and 
national level throughout the country and have confidence that their children 
could be educated anywhere in Canada in their own language. 
In our ministerial discussions, Quebec passionately argued  
that constitutional entrenchment of minority-language education guarantees 
would be a direct assault on exclusive provincial legis-lative jurisdiction over 
education. Quebec also argued that the proposed section 23 would eventually 
dilute the French language and culture in Quebec. Clearly, these opposing 
visions offered little room for compromise. 
When one reflects on the passionate debate over minority-language 
education rights, together with all of the other issues on the table, it is not 
surprising that many of the details of the Charter of Rights were not debated by 
the federal government and the provincial governments to the extent that they 
deserved. 
In any event, the version of the Charter of Rights that was tabled in October 
of 1980 was somewhat different than what was proposed in early 1981. For 
example, in relation to legal rights, in October the wording of section 8, with 
respect to search and seizure, and section 9, with respect to detention or 
imprisonment, was as follows: 
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 8. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to search and seizure except on 
grounds and in accordance with procedures established by law. 
 
 9. Everyone has the right not to be detained or imprisoned except in 
accordance with procedures established by law. 
 
The sections were, of course, amended to employ the words “unreasonable 
search or seizure” and “the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.”1 
These amendments obviously would delegate a great deal more interpretative 
responsibility to judges. The amendments in early 1981 might also be said to 
reflect the more effective advocacy of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association 
than that of the Canadian chiefs of police. It also should be emphasized that the 
amendments had the enthusiastic support of M.P.’s of all parties. 
Backing up for a moment, it should be recalled that the constitutional debate 
became extremely polarized after the failed First Ministers’ Conference in 
September of 1980. 
Premier Davis and I were particularly disturbed by what we regarded as an 
overly belligerent and uncompromising attitude towards Mr. Trudeau that was 
displayed by some of the premiers. In fact, the 1980 first ministers’ meeting 
blew up before its official commencement at a dinner hosted by Governor 
General Edward Schreyer. Some of the premiers insisted that they wanted one 
of the premiers to co-chair the meeting. To say the least, the Prime Minister 
was not pleased and I recall his saying to the Governor General, “Ed, will you 
please get the dessert served so that I can get the hell out of here.” 
In October of 1980, Prime Minister Trudeau announced the intention of the 
federal government to proceed unilaterally with a request to the British 
government to introduce a new Constitution Act in the United Kingdom 
Parliament. This infuriated the majority of the premiers and the media-
described “gang of eight” premiers was formed, with only Ontario and New 
Brunswick supporting the federal government. The opposing premiers believed 
that the actions of the federal government signified the abandonment of 
Canadian traditions of compromise and accommodation. So began a bitter and 
protracted confrontation which ceased only after an accord was reached at the 
First Ministers’ Conference in November of 1981. 
The support of Ontario for the federal proposals was based on our belief that 
it would not serve the public interest for the country to isolate the federal 
government on this important issue, particularly as we strongly believed that 
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after more than 50 years of protracted debate, the Canadian Constitution should 
cease to be an Act of the British Parliament. 
In the debates that followed it was often unfairly suggested that those 
opposing the Charter were less committed to the protection of individual rights. 
In fact, the debate was fundamentally about how best to protect individual 
rights. The provinces that were opposed to an entrenched charter of rights 
strongly believed that legislatures could more effectively provide such 
protection than the courts. 
The unhappy American experience in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries was frequently cited. Rigid judicial interpretation of the United States 
Bill of Rights had blocked important reform legislation, particularly in the area of 
worker protection and child labour reform and, of course, racial desegregation. 
In Ontario’s view, the entrenchment of a charter of rights was a valid 
response to a widely perceived need. We regarded it as a legitimate step in our 
nation’s development. The charter represented a balance between the dominant 
English and French legal traditions as well as reflecting the plurality of our 
country as a whole. Above all, it represented what Canada stood for as a nation: 
a basic respect for individual rights subject only to the wise restraints that could 
be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” While each 
province had passed human rights legislation, it was important to Ontario that 
there be a charter of rights that applied equally throughout Canada. 
I spent some time in London in January of 1981 speaking to parliamentarians 
and journalists in support of the federal constitutional package. At the same time, I 
was personally very concerned about the political legitimacy of the federal 
proposals, given the opposition of the eight provincial governments and the three 
court challenges in Manitoba, Newfoundland and Quebec. 
The Attorney General for England and Wales, Sir Michael Havers, was a 
personal friend and we discussed at length the viability of Westminster passing 
the patriation package while three provincial appellate courts in Canada were 
considering the constitutionality of the proposals. 
The result was that I became somewhat of a double agent when I enlisted Sir 
Michael Havers’ agreement to recommend to the British Cabinet that they 
strongly encourage the Canadian government to make a direct reference to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
In a follow-up letter to Sir Michael Havers, I stated, in part, as follows: 
 
My fear is that these worthy goals may be put in jeopardy by an approach which, in 
its haste, does appear insensitive to legitimate questions that others have posed as 
to its legality, and perhaps inattentive to the need to gain the support of a broad 
consensus in Canada for the changes. 
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I became somewhat unpopular with my federal colleagues when they learned 
of my intervention with Attorney General Havers. However, a few weeks later 
the reference to the Supreme Court of Canada was launched. 
When I reflect on the British role in our constitutional debate, I share the 
embarrassment of many that the Canadian political debate had to be exported to 
Britain. One result was that British parliamentarians ate very well for many months 
as they were being aggressively lobbied by the Canadian federal and provincial 
governments. A second, more important consequence of the lobbying was that 
during 1981 many British parliamentarians became increasingly paternalistic about 
Canada’s political future. 
Indeed, I remember Jean Chrétien telling me about a dinner that he had with 
United Kingdom parliamentarians in London. Although most of these 
parliamentarians had never been to Canada, they were apparently very generous 
in their advice as to how Canadians should resolve the Quebec issue. By the 
end of the evening Jean had become somewhat irritated. He announced that he 
would be having lunch in Belfast the next day and that he hoped that they could 
rejoin him for dinner the next night so that he could advise them as to how to 
settle the problems in Northern Ireland. 
British parliamentarians were, for the most part, sceptical of the Canadian 
proposal for the constitutional entrenchment of the Charter of Rights as they 
believed strongly in the supremacy of Parliament. This also encouraged some 
very paternalistic views as to the wisdom of Canada proceeding down that road. 
When the Supreme Court delivered its decision in September of 1981, it 
stated that, although constitutionally legal, the patriation package would breach 
a long-standing constitutional convention of substantial provincial support 
whenever Britain had been requested to amend our constitution. 
As we approached November 1981, two of the most controversial issues 
were the Charter of Rights and the amending formula. In relation to the Charter 
of Rights, the principle of the supremacy of Parliament was still a fundamental 
issue for the majority of the provinces. Clearly, a principled compromise had to 
be found. 
Early in the week of the November First Ministers’ Conference, events 
conspired to give me some time alone with the Prime Minister. I had become 
convinced that the inclusion of a notwithstanding clause in the Charter would be 
the only way to gain the support of the majority of the premiers as well as being 
an honourable compromise. Mr. Trudeau was not at all enthusiastic but he was 
listening. 
In any event, it was Premier Lévesque’s support of Trudeau’s proposal for a 
national referendum on the Constitution that shattered the alliance between the 
Quebec premier and his seven other heretofore provincial allies. Most 
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provincial premiers regarded the federal referendum process as a federal tactic 
to bypass the provincial governments and deal directly with their citizens. 
The inclusion of a notwithstanding clause in the Charter proved to be the 
compromise that achieved the necessary support in relation to an entrenched 
charter. The inclusion attracted a great deal of controversy but, in my view, it 
represented an honourable compromise representing a balancing mechanism 
between the institutions of Parliament and the judiciary. 
As I reflect on the historical perspective that I have been invited to address 
this morning, I am reminded of Machiavelli’s warning of the risks related to the 
making of constitutions. As regards the roles played by Chrétien, Roy 
Romanow and myself, it may be recalled that we all lost our next political 
battles. Romanow was defeated in a provincial election two weeks after the 
patriation of the Constitution and Jean Chrétien lost his first leadership contest. 
In fact, I remember being on a conference call with Jean Chrétien and Roy 
Romanow the day after the federal election in September of 1984. As we 
concluded our conversation, Jean stated, “I don’t think that the Canadian people 
like the new constitution. First they get you Romanow, yesterday they got us,” 
and to me he said, “big Roy keep your head up.” Several months later I lost my 
own bid to become the leader of a certain political party in Ontario. 
So much for the making of a constitution. 
